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Abstract: Leading into the Second 
World War, the Royal Canadian Air 
Force requested Federal Cabinet 
approval of restrictive enlistment 
regulations that effectively barred 
the visible minorities from serving. 
Cabinet approved these regulations, 
yet by March 1942 these regulations 
were eliminated at the instigation of 
the RCAF. This paper compares the 
enlistment practices of the Royal 
Canadian Navy and the Militia to 
those of the RCAF. It then examines 
the potential reasons for these RCAF 
regulations, how they were applied 
and the process leading to their 
elimination. Finally, the application 
of the new, non-racist policies is 
examined.
The Canadian military services have not  been immune to 
racism. During the First World War 
recruiting officers at Militia units in 
British Columbia refused to accept 
Chinese-Canadians, with the result 
that they had to travel to Alberta and 
Ontario to enlist, while Japanese-
Canadians were only accepted after 
a great deal of lobbying. Black-
Canadians faced similar prejudice 
to that of the Chinese-Canadians 
in their attempts to enlist.1 The 
refusal of some units to accept visible 
minorities into their ranks, however, 
was the result of decisions on the part 
of individual officers. There were no 
such proscriptive regulations.
Although members of those 
minorities who did participate in the 
war effort of 1914 to 1919 acquitted 
themselves very well, their efforts 
did not result in long-term changes 
in practice – the opposite was true. 
By the start of the Second World War, 
the regulations of the navy and air 
force were specifically exclusionary; 
only whites were accepted into 
almost all categories for enlistment. 
In the Militia, units were still able to 
decide for themselves whether or not 
to accept visible minority volunteers, 
with many deciding not to do so.
In 1938 and early 1939, the Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) put 
in place regulations prohibiting 
enlistment of visible minorities in 
most categories, and the government 
approved these regulations by 
orders-in-council. During the early 
years of the war policy rulings by 
senior authorities further proscribed 
enlistment of Canada’s non-white 
populat ion . 2 Actual  pract ice , 
however, was more flexible. In fact, 
while the RCAF was the first among 
the three armed forces to introduce 
exclusionary regulations and policies, 
the service subsequently took the 
lead in eliminating them. In many 
ways these actions, together with 
varying practices of RCAF recruiting 
officers, reflected the diversity of 
views prevalent in Canadian society 
towards visible minorities.
 The focus of this paper is the 
evolution and then demise of the 
RCAF’s regulations, policies and 
practices for the exclusion of non-
white Canadians during the Second 
World War. While there is some 
literature about the participation 
of Black, Chinese and Japanese-
Canadians in the Canadian military 
effort of 1939 to 1945, these works 
do not treat enlistment policies in 
any detail.3 This study will examine 
the cases of Black and Chinese-
Canadians; the special circumstances 
that limited participation of Japanese-
Canadians in the Second World War 
are beyond the scope of the present 
paper.4 Aboriginal Canadians will 
not be considered as policy did not 
restrict their enlistment. 
The RCAF’s enlistment policies 
can only be properly understood 
in the context of the policies of the 
other two Canadian armed forces, 
the Royal Canadian Navy and the 
Canadian Militia,  5 and Britain’s 
Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and 
Army upon which the Canadian 
forces modelled themselves. 
Both the RCAF and the RCN 
established their exclusionary 
enlistment regulations in 1938 on 
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the basis of British precedents. The 
Royal Navy’s “Regulations for the 
Entry of Naval Cadets” of 1906 
stated that “candidates must be of 
pure European descent.”6 The Royal 
Naval Air Service and the Royal 
Flying Corps (RFC), which in 1918 
had combined to form the Royal 
Air Force, also required that officer 
candidates be of pure European 
descent. This was enforced in Canada 
and other British Empire nations 
in recruitment for the British flying 
services during the First World War. 
It was not, however, universal as 
white people with Maori background 
could be enlisted.7 
Such were the demands for 
manpower during the First World 
War that troops had to be recruited 
from the non-white populations of 
the British Empire, but officers from 
visible minorities rarely led European 
troops or became pilots. Commissions 
were the last bastion of the pure 
European descent regulation, as the 
War Office considered that “a British 
private will never follow a half-caste 
or native officer.”8 There were always 
a few exceptions, such as Walter Tull, 
a Black Briton of Caribbean descent, 
who was killed in action on 25 
March 1918 while leading his troops 
during the German spring offensive, 
Sergeant William Robinson Clarke 
of Jamaica and five Indian officers 
who served in the RFC and Royal Air 
Force (RAF). One Black-Canadian, 
George Frederick Shreve, transferred 
from the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force to the RFC in August 1917 to 
become a pilot, was commissioned 
and served until July 1919.9 
Between the wars, the three British 
services reverted to the exclusionary 
regulations. Air Ministry Weekly 
Order 603/1921(issued 28 July 1921) 
required that “[w]ith the exception 
of boys, recruits must be of pure 
European descent and the sons of 
natural-born or naturalized British 
subjects.” The exception for boys was 
later eliminated, and when the RAF’s 
first recruiting regulations appeared 
as Air Publication (AP) 948, they 
codified the pure European descent 
and British subject requirements. 
The requirement to be of pure 
European descent was also enforced 
for enlistment in the Auxiliary Air 
Force and RAF Special Reserve.10 
In 1924, in response to a question in 
Parliament, the under-secretary of 
state at the Air Ministry responded 
that the RAF policy of pure European 
descent was maintained because 
mixing “European and non-European 
subjects in the same fighting service 
raises grave practical difficulties.” 
The British Army required that 
for promotion from the ranks to 
combatant commissions as second 
lieutenants, candidates had to be of 
pure European descent, as well as 
being a British subject and the son of 
British subjects.11 
Royal Canadian Navy
The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) was the first of the three services 
to incorporate a racial enlistment 
restriction in its regulations and the 
last of the three services to modify 
the restriction. In 1938, an order-
in-council changed the regulations 
so that candidates for commissions 
as officers had to be “of the white 
race and must be a British subject 
who has resided, or whose parents 
have resided in Canada for two 
years immediately preceding the 
date of entry.” Ratings also had to 
be of the “white race” except that 
the applicant only had to be a British 
subject.12 The reasoning for excluding 
visible minorities was that “[i]t is, in 
general, considered undesirable to 
mix Asiatic races with White under 
living conditions which prevail in 
small ships.”13 Confined spaces did 
not “lend themselves to satisfactory 
mixing” of races; “enrolment [of non-
whites] would cause immediate and 
continued dissatisfaction amongst 
white ratings.”14 The objective was 
thus to maintain “all Royal Navies… 
of Pure European Descent and of the 
White Race.”15 
The original caption for this official 
photograph read, “Darkies, who with 
others, load Canadian Corps tramways 
with ammunition, resting.” These are 
just a few of the estimated 800 Black 
Canadians who served with distinction 
on the Western Front during the First 
World War.
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On 9 November 1942, at the 
weekly meeting of the Naval Board, 
Angus L. Macdonald, minister of 
national defence for naval services, 
observed that the Army and the 
RCAF were accepting applicants of 
all races, and urged that the Navy 
should consider doing the same. 16 
In May 1943 Naval Monthly Order 
2653 was issued, stating in part: 
“All applicants of whatever race 
are to be treated on an equal basis 
as recruits. This includes coloured 
citizens.”17 A proposed amendment 
to Naval Regulations (“it is ordered 
that any male British Subject of 
any racial origin may be entered 
for the period of hostilities in the 
Canadian Naval Forces”18) was not 
carried out until 22 July 1944.19 The 
Navy, much the smallest of the 
three armed forces, never had a 
problem finding recruits,20 and there 
was thus no apparent urgency to 
change its enlistment requirements. 
Rather, the new policy appears to 
have reflected the convictions of the 
minister. Macdonald, formerly the 
premier of Nova Scotia and known 
as a social reformer, had taken the 
navy portfolio in the Federal Cabinet 
in 1940. He questioned the aping of 
Royal Navy personnel policies and 
urged changes that better reflected 
Canada’s more open society.21 
During the period of restricted 
enlistment, several instances were 
noted where members of visible 
minority groups were enrolled. 
William Lore, a Chinese-Canadian, 
enlisted in January 1943, and was 
likely an exception based on personal 
intervention, in this case by Vice-
Admiral Percy W. Nelles, chief of 
the naval staff, while Japanese-
Canadian David Tsubota enlisted in 
1940 and was soon released.22 Black-
Canadians were also apparently 
enlisted before the change; however, 
because of the lack of documentation, 
the exact number or details cannot 
be ascertained. These Blacks were 
enlisted into specific trades, such 
as stewards and cooks, much as 
the Royal Navy employed Chinese 
stewards and cooks.23
Canadian Militia/Army
The situation in the Canadian Militia differed considerably 
from the RCN. The Militia had 
no regulations limiting enlistment 
on the basis of ethnicity, only the 
requirement to be a British subject for 
appointment as an officer in both the 
Permanent Active Militia (the regular 
force) and the Non-Permanent Active 
Militia (the reserves, or “citizen 
soldiers”).24 Within months of the 
start of the war, the need to be a 
British subject was removed from 
the requirements to be an officer in 
the Non-Permanent Active Militia.25 
The enlistment situation during 
the Second World War was similar 
to that of the First World War. 
Commanding officers decided 
whether or not to accept visible 
minor i ty  members  into  the ir 
units, and while military district 
headquarters could and did apply 
pressure to have these individuals 
accepted, the headquarters were 
loath to interfere in what had 
traditionally been a commanding 
officer’s prerogative. The result in 
both wars was that regiments in 
some areas readily accepted Black-
Canadians, while in others did 
not. The creation in 1916 of No. 2 
Construction Battalion as a means 
of allowing the enlistment of Black-
Sub-Lieutenant W.K.L. Lore, RCNVR, 
photographed in Halifax on 27 March 
1944. Lore, a Chinese-Canadian, was 
able to join the navy due to the personal 
intervention of the chief of the naval 
staff during a period of restricted 
enlistment.
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Canadians is well known; less so is 
the fact that at least another 800 Black-
Canadians were able to enlist in other 
units of the Canadian Expeditionary 
Force.26 A handful of Blacks were 
even granted commissions, with 
Lieutenant Lancelot Joseph Bertrand 
being among the first.27 Halifax was 
one area where some members of 
the Militia were prejudiced against 
Blacks. The Black population of the 
Halifax area had been pressing in 
the 1930s for greater participation 
by their community in the Militia.28 
With the onset of the Second World 
War,  Mil i t ia  Headquarters  in 
Ottawa advised the district officer 
commanding, Military District (MD) 
No.6, Brigadier H.E. Boak, that the 
formation of coloured units, one 
option he was considering on the 
precedent of the First World War 
No. 2 Construction Battalion that had 
been organized in Nova Scotia, was 
contrary to government policy.29 Yet 
a survey on recruitment indicated 
that 14 units in the area had no 
desire to enlist Black personnel.30 
The consensus among MD 6 units 
was that coloured units or sub-units 
be formed. In July 1940, however, 
Army Headquarters, as Militia 
Headquarters had been renamed, 
confirmed that there was no intention 
to form such units, but, nevertheless, 
the prerogative of commanding 
officers to select recruits “should 
not be interfered with and that 
no pressure should be placed on 
them to take coloured persons.”31 
When pushed by members of the 
public, Army Headquarters provided 
a standard response that as long 
as Blacks met physical and other 
requirements for active service, 
there was nothing preventing their 
enlistment.32 
The situation was different in 
Military District 4, with headquarters 
at Montreal, where Blacks, in this 
case from the British West Indies 
(BWI), were being enlisted. The 
movement of individuals from the 
British West Indies to enlist in Canada 
was well underway by the summer 
of 1941. In July 1941, the under-
secretary of state for external affairs, 
Norman Robertson, sent a letter to 
H. Desrosiers, acting deputy minister 
(army), indicating that the colonial 
secretary in Jamaica wished to send 
men to Canada for enlistment in the 
Army.33 In August 1941 Major W.H. 
Scott, the district recruiting officer, 
MD 4, received letters from the 
commissioner of police of Barbados 
recommending two constables for 
service in the Canadian Army. Both 
letters from the applicants stated 
that they were Black. Major Scott 
replied that as long as the individuals 
passed the medical standards, no 
difficulty was anticipated in their 
enlistment.34 Major Scott indicated in 
one letter that previous enlistees had 
acquitted themselves well, although 
no mention was made of their skin 
colour.35 Organized groups of BWI 
candidates began to arrive in Canada 
in September 1941 and continued 
until at least September 1942; the 
recruiting officer for the MD was 
quite receptive and the individuals, 
both Black and White were almost 
all readily enlisted into MD 4 units.36 
Nevertheless,  efforts  were 
underway to turn back coloured 
recruits from the BWI. In response 
Brigadier Georges Vanier, a future 
governor-general of Canada, chatting 
with a wounded Black soldier at No.17 
Canadian General Hospital, Pinewood, 
England, 30 September 1943 
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to Robertson’s letter of July 1941, 
Desrosiers indicated that Jamaicans 
would not make good soldiers, as 
they were happy-go-lucky, worked 
sporadically, and were extremely 
temperamental, easily fatigued 
and highly emotional.37 This was 
followed a week later by another 
letter suggesting that the Jamaicans 
could not handle Canadian military 
training or the Canadian military 
diet.38 No further correspondence 
appears to have been exchanged 
between Robertson and Desrosiers 
on the matter; however, the issue did 
not rest there.
In September 1941, T.A. Crerar, the 
minister responsible for immigration, 
wrote to defence minister J. Layton 
Ralston warning that there was an 
organized movement to send “negro 
volunteers” from Barbados to enlist. 
The first group had arrived on 26 
September and another group was 
scheduled to leave around 4 October. 
Crerar indicated that the matter 
would require special handling to 
avoid discriminating against the 
Black Barbadians as there were also 
White Barbadians in the group and 
all were British subjects.39 In late 
September 1941 Desrosiers wrote to 
H.C. Collier, a Montreal businessman 
who promoted West Indies tourism 
and trade and was acting on behalf 
of the volunteers from the Caribbean, 
that the arrival of coloured persons 
was an immigration question. More 
important, Desrosiers noted that 
there was a question of whether the 
coloured individuals could handle 
the Canadian winter, suggesting that 
all enlistment be held in abeyance 
until the spring.40 . Then in October, 
F.C. Blair, director of immigration, 
and noted for his efforts to apply 
policies in ways that achieved 
exclusion, wrote to Robertson that 
“National Defence while not refusing 
to take coloured volunteers, wishes to 
discourage the movement.”41 Collier 
noted the contradictory responses to 
his efforts to facilitate recruitment 
from the British West Indies when he 
wrote to Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King in October 1941.42 
T h e  t i d e  w a s  b e g i n n i n g 
to turn, possibly because of the 
successful enlistment of previous 
BWI applicants. In November, the 
judge advocate general at Army 
Headquarters suggested acceptance 
of limited numbers of coloured 
applicants and that training syllabi be 
sent to the BWI to assist in preparing 
these individuals.43 One last effort was 
made in 1942 to restrict enlistment 
when Major-General Harry Letson, 
the adjutant-general, took a different 
approach, considering the problem to 
be one of repatriation after the war; 
he underscored that the Army had 
no obligation to return the recruits 
to the BWI.44
Al though the  records  are 
incomplete, at least 200 applicants 
arrived in Canada from the British 
West Indies up to August 1942; at 
least 37 were Black, with a figure of 
75 or more likely to be closer to the 
actual number.45 Almost all the BWI 
recruits were successful in enlisting, 
including the applicants known to be 
Black. This suggests that the units in 
MD 4 to which they applied had no 
problem accepting Black recruits. Still, 
both government officials and officers 
in Army Headquarters attempted to 
find ways to discourage coloured 
applicants, using the excuse that this 
was an immigration question, which 
conveniently ignored the fact that 
many American citizens were coming 
into Canada to enlist without such 
impediments. 
For Chinese-Canadians, regional 
racism – in this case in British 
Columbia – was also a factor. From 
the data available, it would appear 
that actual enlistments were limited 
in number. The biggest problem 
in determining the actual numbers 
is the fact that the Army did not 
maintain lists of soldiers from visible 
minorities. From the names and 
narratives provided by Marjorie 
Wong, at least 17 Chinese-Canadians 
voluntarily enlisted in the Army 
between the start of the war and the 
end of 1942, including seven who 
joined before 1 January 1942.46 
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World War (l. to r.): Privates O. Lee, F. 
Lee, G.A. Lee, W. Lee, K.D. Wong and 
J.H. Ma.
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Of the three services, the policies 
and practices of the Army were the 
least racist. There were racist units in 
some military districts, with possibly 
some MDs having greater numbers 
than others. Individual racism existed 
such as noted in the attitudes of unit 
commanding officers in MD 6 and by 
the staff officers who prepared the 
various letters cited above. However, 
the apparent wider enlistment of 
Black and Chinese Canadians in the 
Army suggests that most units treated 
applicants fairly and restrictions were 
more a matter of local prejudices than 
Army policy or practice. 
T h e  e n l i s t m e n t  p r a c t i c e s 
contrasted by units in MD 4 and MD 
6 demonstrate this dichotomy. Quite 
possibly, the circumstances noted in 
the Halifax area were isolated and 
not a policy within the Canadian 
Army as clearly, once these coloured 
applicants had made it to MD 4, they 
were readily accepted by local units, 
demonstrating that allowing local 
commanding officers the freedom 
to select recruits could work both 
for and against the recruitment 
of coloured persons. Likewise the 
fact that Chinese-Canadians had 
to go outside British Columbia to 
enlist highlights the nature of local 
prejudices.
With its policy of allowing unit 
commanding officers the freedom 
to choose their own recruits, the 
Army was in part allowing racism 
to be conducted; however, it does 
appear that efforts were made to 
apply pressure on units to change 
their practices without stepping on 
the prerogative of units to choose 
from among applicants. On the other 
hand, the efforts to hinder, if not 
prevent the entry of Black potential 
recruits into Canada is indicative of 
a racist attitude, supported in part 
by government bureaucracy. Despite 
efforts at Army Headquarters to 
turn back coloured applicants from 
the BWI in MD 4, the efforts were 
unsuccessful, possibly because of 
the political sensitivities of rejecting 
British subjects simply because of 
skin colour. Yet, Army HQ was 
attempting at the same time to push 
MD 6 units to accept more Blacks.
Royal Canadian Air Force
The RCAF’s adoption of policies and regulations that excluded 
visible minorities shortly before the 
Second World War would appear 
to parallel that of the RCN. Like the 
Navy, the Air Force existed only in 
cadre strength prior to rearmament 
in the late 1930s. Indeed the Air Force 
was administered as a branch of the 
Militia under the authority of the 
chief of the general staff and did not 
achieve the status of an independent 
armed service until December 1938, 
when Air Vice-Marshal G.M. Croil 
became the first chief of the air staff. 
With expansion and reorganization, 
the Air Force, like the Navy, took 
guidance from its British counterpart. 
Only two visible minority members, 
both Black-Canadians, are known to 
have enlisted in the RCAF during 
the interwar period. These were 
Gerald William Alexander Bell, 
who joined No.119 Squadron of the 
Non-Permanent Active Air Force 
(NPAAF), that is the reserve force, 
on 11 June 1936 and E.V. Watts who 
enlisted in No.1 Squadron of the 
Permanent Active Air Force (PAAF), 
or regular force, on 1 May 1939. 
In both cases the airmen enlisted 
before the adoption of exclusionary 
regulations.
Although these are the only two 
visible minority members known to 
have enlisted, this does not mean that 
the RCAF was practicing exclusion. 
The RCAF was a very small force that 
began to recruit significant numbers 
only in the latter half of the 1930s, and 
even then the number of positions 
available was far smaller than the 
number of applicants, allowing the 
service – both the regular force and 
reserves – to select only the best 
qualified candidates.47 
See Table 1.
Table 1 
Enlistments by year for the 
Permanent Active Air Force48
Year Strength as of 31 March
Number 
recruited
1933 694 0
1934 692 6
1935 794 109
1936 1026 246
1937 1107 120
1938 1701 654
1939 2191 482
Allan English in his work The 
Cream of the Crop  suggests one 
possibly important influence on 
RCAF aircrew selection. Social 
Darwinism, he shows, played a role 
in aircrew enlistment in the British air 
services during the First World War. 
The exclusion of non-whites from 
flying was based in part on the belief 
that white people were a superior 
race, especially in light of the success 
of European nations over foreign, 
non-white nations and peoples. 
These ideas of superiority extended 
to the belief that some ethnic groups 
were better suited than others to be 
pilots in terms of intellect, hand-eye 
coordination and other physical 
attributes.49 Whether this was the 
case in the RCAF during the interwar 
period is not known; however, 
the close association between the 
RAF and the RCAF (whose senior 
members had in many cases served 
with the British air forces during the 
First World War) would suggest that 
members of the RCAF would have 
been exposed to this idea.
English also observes that the 
Royal Air Force placed emphasis 
on class distinctions in selecting its 
pilots.50 There is no study available on 
whether RCAF pilots in the interwar 
period were selected on the basis of 
class or whether class played a role 
in allowing some to be chosen over 
6
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others, but several observations can 
be made. Individuals applying for 
the NPAAF of the RCAF were given 
some preference if they already 
had a pilot’s licence. Such a licence 
was not readily available to all 
Canadians. The costs involved were 
high and beyond the reach of most, 
especially with the effects of the 
Depression of the 1930s. In the same 
vein, during the interwar period, the 
RCAF offered flying training to a 
limited number of candidates such 
as university students. Education 
was a large part of the selection 
process as schooling was considered 
an indicator of intelligence, and 
provided essential background for 
flying training.51 Robin W. Winks 
notes that schools attended by Blacks 
were often not as good as schools in 
predominantly white districts, being 
underfunded and in some provinces, 
such as Nova Scotia, ignored by 
the provincial government. Often 
Blacks dropped out of school by 
grade six or seven.52 The problem 
of obtaining sufficiently educated 
recruits was such that the RCAF and 
the Army reached an agreement in 
February 1941 that allowed the RCAF 
to recruit from among the Army’s 
trainees and the Army Reserve. 
That same month Defence Council 
agreed that the RCAF should have 
first choice among applicants having 
junior matriculation or lesser high 
school education.53 Thus, educational 
standards precluded a large part 
of the population from enlisting in 
the RCAF, including many visible 
minority members.
When the Canadian Air Force 
was established in 1923 (the “royal” 
designation came in the following 
year), the regulations indicated that 
the service was open to all individuals, 
provided they were British subjects.54 
Starting in May 1938, in the midst of 
the expansion and reorganization 
of the Air Force as a fully separate 
armed service, there were changes 
in the King’s Regulations and Orders 
(KR (Air)) pertaining to enlistment.55 
Because the RCAF consisted of 
two components, the regular force 
(PAAF) and the reserves (NPAAF), 
and enlistment requirements for 
officers and airmen were different, 
four categories of personnel needed 
to be addressed: officers of both 
components and airmen of both 
components.
On 17 August 1938, the Federal 
Cabinet issued Order-in-Council PC 
1994 which added the requirement 
of “pure European descent and a 
British Subject, the son of parents 
both of whom are, or if deceased 
were at the time of their deaths, 
British Subjects” for candidates to be 
commissioned as officers in both the 
PAAF and NPAAF.56 The change was 
promulgated on 15 September with 
the caveat that it was effective back 
to 1 March. 
For airmen, the change was 
made only to the reserves,  or 
Auxiliary Active Air Force (AAAF) 
as the NPAAF had been renamed, 
when Order-in-Council PC 233 
was approved on 31 January 1939 
and promulgated in RCAF General 
Orders that same day. Interestingly, 
the regulation here was stated 
negatively: “Men who are not both 
of pure European descent and the 
sons of natural born or naturalized 
British subjects” were not eligible 
for enlistment or re-enlistment.57 The 
speed with which the amendment 
was approved by the Federal Cabinet 
and promulgated by the RCAF 
suggests there were no questions 
raised about exclusion on racial 
grounds.58 Strikingly the process 
of amending the KR (Air) began 
when the RCAF was still under 
the authority of the chief of the 
general staff (CGS), who evidently 
accepted enlistment regulations more 
restrictive than those for the land 
forces. One explanation might be 
adherence to the RAF’s regulations 
as a model for the reorganization 
of the RCAF as a more combat 
oriented force, the foremost feature 
of Canadian rearmament on the eve 
of the Second World War. 
When Canada declared war on 
Germany on 10 September 1939, all 
officers joining the RCAF and airmen 
joining the reserves (AAAF) had to 
be of pure European descent, but no 
action had been taken similarly to 
restrict enlistments as airmen in the 
regular force. The latter still had only 
had to be British subjects. 
Further restrictive regulations 
and policies were to ensue with 
wartime expansion. The terms of 
service for neither the regular or 
auxiliary forces were fully suitable 
to enlist large numbers of volunteers 
Gerry Bell, from Hamilton, Ontario, was 
one of only two known Black-Canadians 
to enlist in the RCAF during the interwar 
years.
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for service during hostilities only. For 
this reason the RAF created a new 
component – the Special Reserve – in 
September 1939.59 Henceforth, almost 
all new enlistments were to the Special 
Reserve, leaving the establishments 
of the other components at their 
prewar numbers.60 
With the creation of the RCAF 
Special Reserve amendments to the 
KR (Air) had to be made quickly. 
On 29 September 1939, the RCAF 
passed their proposed Order-in-
Council to the Privy Council Office, 
which the Cabinet approved on 13 
October. It included the provision 
that candidates for commissioning 
in the Special Reserve had to be “of 
pure European descent and (except 
in case of an appointment to the 
Special Reserve) a British Subject, the 
son of parents both of whom are, or 
if deceased were at the time of their 
deaths, British Subjects [underscoring 
added].”61 Airmen, on the other hand, 
could be of any skin colour and no 
longer had to be British subjects if 
they joined the Special Reserve. The 
latter change was likely made as 
Americans had been offering their 
services to the RCAF since the start 
of the war and were being enlisted. 
See Table 2.
 The exception that allowed 
direct appointment to commissions 
in the Special Reserve for those not of 
European descent in theory opened 
the door for qualified members of 
Table 2 
Authorization Date of Restrictive Regulations and Policies
Component Rank Restrictive Regulation Restrictive Policy
Permanent Active Air Force
Officers PC 1994, 17 August 1938
Airmen nil nil
Auxiliary Active Air Force
Officers PC 1994, 17 August 1938
Airmen PC 233, 31 Juanuary 1939
Special Reserve
Officers PC 3050, 11 October 1939
Airmen Letter S6496, 1 May 1940
The December 1942 course at No. 
1 Initial Training School in Toronto 
included both Flying Officer Tarrance 
Freeman and Flying Officer Alan Bundy, 
respectively the first and second Black-
Canadians known to be commissioned 
in the RCAF.  F/O Freeman is fifth from 
the left in the back row and F/O Bundy 
is second from the right in the front row.
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visible minorities.62 In fact, for the 
aircrew trades almost all recruits 
started as airmen; 10 to 15 percent of 
the top graduates in each class were 
commissioned as, subsequently, were 
others who demonstrated leadership 
capacity in the course of their duties. 
Thus, the possibility existed that a 
coloured airman could become an 
officer in what was supposed to be 
a purely “European” officer corps 
according to the regulations.
While there was no regulatory 
restriction on visible minorities 
enlisting as airmen in the Special 
Reserve, the RCAF set up barriers 
in part to prevent the situation 
described above.63 In May 1940 
RCAF Headquarters sent a letter 
to all recruiting centres that noted 
“obstacles which present themselves, 
and  which  prevent  eventua l 
enlistment of an applicant.” The 
letter suggested that failure to pass 
particular trade tests or medical 
examinations could be used to find an 
applicant unsuitable for enlistment.64 
Further RCAF pamphlets and 
instructions were clear in their 
Photo supplied by author, courtesy of RCAF veteran Don Stevenson of Abbottsford, BC who is first left, back row.
requirement that aircrew candidates 
be of “pure European descent.”65 By 
January 1941 the RCAF had decided 
that visible minorities could enlist in 
general duty trades, such as clerks, 
cooks, drivers, and mess men, but not 
in aircrew or groundcrew trades.66 
A letter from Wing Commander 
H.P. Crabb at headquarters to all 
recruiting centres on 7 October 1941 
explained the policy in response 
to centres ignoring restrictions on 
enlistments of visible minorities.
Notwithstanding the regulations 
in the KR (Air), only those of pure 
European descent will be accepted 
for appointment or enlistment in 
Aircrew. There is no reason why 
applicants should not be frankly 
told of this general policy as those 
not of European descent cannot 
then feel that it is a personal 
discrimination.
Orientals and Negroes who are 
British subjects cannot be barred 
from enlistment in any category 
in General Duties for which they 
might be suitable.67
Applications from Chinese 
and Negroes in the General Duties 
category were to be sent to Air Force 
Headquarters. The file had to include 
a recommendation concerning 
their potential for service in the 
RCAF’s “white environment.” The 
applicants should be: “adaptable, 
temperamentally suited and of a 
disposition likely to be equal to the 
test of close association with men 
of the white race. Actually, the Air 
Force does not want coloured people 
because of the difficulties of racial 
differences.”
No mention was to be made 
to applicants that their application 
would undergo a second review 
at Air Force Headquarters.68 Thus, 
while the RCAF policy indicated 
that visible minorities could enlist 
for general duty trades, the RCAF 
preferred that they not enlist.
Despite the restrictions, some 
members  of  v is ib le  minor i ty 
groups were able to enlist and not 
necessarily in general duty trades. 
One Japanese-Canadian is known 
to have enlisted prior to the policy 
9
: Racism and Enlistment The Second World War Policies of the Royal Canadian Air Force
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
26
change, Jim Ubukata who was born 
in Moose Jaw to an English mother 
and Japanese father. He enlisted 
in the RCAF in 1940, being told 
he would be accepted as aircrew. 
Initially rejected for aircrew, he 
was then selected for groundcrew 
training but then reverted to aircrew 
as an airborne radar operator due to 
his prior training at a radio school. 
The irony of the situation was that 
he was initially not accepted for 
aircrew due to his ethnic origin, 
but later was accepted into a highly 
sensitive trade.69 The number of 
Chinese-Canadians known to have 
enlisted during the war is low. Of 
69 Chinese-Canadians confirmed as 
having been in the RCAF, only one 
was able to enlist prior to the opening 
of enlistment to all in February 1942. 
John Victor Ching was enrolled on 6 
November 1941 in Winnipeg as an 
air gunner, and after completing his 
training was deployed overseas.70 
His enlistment, like that of Ubukata, 
was an example of RCAF recruiting 
officers ignoring policy.
Black-Canadians were far more 
successful in gaining entry to the 
RCAF, with eight of 49 known 
volunteers  enl is t ing  pr ior  to 
February 1942, of whom six were 
aircrew or groundcrew. Another 
two (Bell and Watts) were already 
in the RCAF before the restrictive 
enlistment policy was implemented. 
There is specific evidence for the 
circumstances of only one of the 
eight pre-1942 wartime entries: 
Samuel Estwick was able to enlist as 
a result of political pressure.71 Equally 
interesting is the case of brothers 
Adolphus and William Carty of 
Saint John, New Brunswick, who 
enrolled in No.118 Coastal Artillery 
Co-operation Squadron in the first 
month of the war. No.118 Squadron 
was an Auxiliary squadron, to which 
the exclusionary restrictions were 
specific. 
The restrictions on enlistment 
in the Special Reserve came from 
within the RCAF, but so too did 
the elimination of this policy in the 
course of revisions of the regulations 
by the personnel division of Air Force 
Headquarters in 1940-1941.72 
When the minister of national 
defence for air, C.G. Power, read 
some of the new KR (Air) regulations 
he observed that the age limit for 
mandatory retirement had been 
increased to age 60; he thought he 
had agreed to 55.73 Air Commodore 
Harold Edwards, air member for 
personnel, received the minister’s 
comments on 4 April 1941, and 
instructed his staff to change the age 
of retirement, and also to remove the 
section on pure European descent. 74 
Why Air Commodore Edwards 
took the step of changing the 
enlistment policy is unknown. 
Manpower shortages were not an 
issue; at that time there was such a 
surfeit of applicants that the service 
could pick and choose for aircrew.75 
It was only in the summer of 1942 
that the RCAF began to experience 
recruiting problems, which came 
after the racist regulation and policies 
had been eliminated.76 The change to 
an inclusive policy, moreover, would 
not have added many potential 
candidates for RCAF service. Visible 
minorities represented a very small 
fraction of the Canadian population, 
and fewer still had the necessary 
educational background or medical 
status. See Table 3.
E d w a r d s  m a y  h a v e  b e e n 
following the lead of the British 
government, which on 19 October 
1939 made the announcement that 
the policy of accepting only those 
of pure European descent had been 
eliminated, and that all ethnic groups 
were welcome. Author Marika 
Sherwood indicates that this change 
was more cosmetic than real as the 
Colonial Office used this as a ploy 
to retain the support for the war 
among “coloured” colonial subjects 
during the hostilities, and that the 
Foreign Office (FO) and Colonial 
Office advised their officials that 
only whites were to continue to 
be accepted. How to handle the 
apparent contradiction between 
the stated policy and the covert 
directions was not communicated to 
officials, who were left to their own 
devices.78 
Whether Edwards knew of the 
British Parliamentary announcement, 
and of the confusion it created, is 
unknown. On 20 May 1941 he wrote 
to Mr. Dyke of the UK Air Liaison 
Mission in Ottawa, requesting 
information about the regulations 
for nationality and racial descent 
for the RAF Volunteer Reserve, and 
about whether coloured persons 
were permitted as aircrew and 
could be commissioned.79 However, 
Edwards’ letter was sent after the 
recommended policy change had 
been sent to the Privy Council Office 
for Cabinet approval. It would 
thus appear that in authoring the 
elimination of the pure European 
descent restriction, Edwards acted 
without detailed knowledge of the 
RAF’s latest practices. This was in 
Table 3 
Canadians of Selected Ethnic Origin (1941 Census)77
Group Men Women % of Canadian Population
Black 22,174 included with men 0.19
Chinese 30,713 3,914 0.30
East Indians 1,059 406 0.013
West Indians 2,219 1,915 0.04
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character for Edwards, who was a 
passionate nationalist. Although he 
had begun his career in the British 
flying services during the First World 
War, and valued the professional and 
sentimental associations between 
the British and Canadian air forces, 
he was determined that the RCAF 
should become a distinctly Canadian 
service, particularly in personnel 
management policies and practices 
that reflected Canadian society. In 
this respect his views were similar 
to those of C.G. Power and it was 
no doubt for that reason that the air 
staff selected Edwards to take charge 
of the RCAF Overseas in November 
1941 to implement the policy of 
“Canadianization” to ensure that 
Canadian graduates of the BCATP 
served in Canadian, rather than 
British, units and formations.80 
 On 23 April 1941, Air Vice-
Marshal L.S. Breadner, chief of the 
air staff, sent the revised KR (Air) 
paragraph to the minister for review. 
In his covering memo, Breadner 
stated: “In order to conform to modern 
conditions, the amendment herein to 
KR (Air), deletes the requirement that 
an applicant for appointment to, or 
enlistment in, the Special Reserve be a 
British subject and of pure European 
descent.”81 Unfortunately, the chief 
of the air staff does not explain what 
these modern conditions were. 
Power approved the revised 
section and sent it to S.L. DeCarteret, 
the deputy minister, on 12 May 
1941 to be forwarded to Privy 
Council. It was approved as Order-
in-Council PC 63/4015 on 5 June 
1941.82 That Cabinet approved the 
change so quickly suggests that 
they were in agreement with the 
regulation, much as they had quickly 
approved PC 233 of 31 January 1939 
quickly after receiving it. It also 
suggests the possibility that Cabinet 
was simply agreeing to whatever 
recommendations were placed before 
them by the armed services during 
wartime. 
Top: At RCAF Headquarters, Minister of National Defence for Air C.G. Power meets the 
heads of the various departments.  Here he talks to Squadron Leader Harry Wright, 
of the personnel department. Air Marshal Harold Edwards (second from left) and Air 
Marshal L.S. Breadner (second from right) are also present, 11 August 1942.
Above: Colonel, The Honorable J.L. Ralston, minister of national defence, and Air Marshal 
Harold Edwards at RCAF Headquarters in London.
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In a letter dated 28 May 1941 to 
Member of Parliament Clarence Gillis 
responding to the latter’s inquiry 
about the enlistment of a Black 
candidate, Power indicated that the 
regulation on enlistment in the Special 
Reserve had recently changed.83 In 
fact, Cabinet would not approve the 
change for another week, indicating 
the minister’s confidence that his 
colleagues would agree. The change 
would also only affect candidates 
for commissions as officers, while 
the person for whom Gillis had 
inquired was applying as an airman 
to the Special Reserve (see Table 2). 
The letter moreover suggested that 
enlistment was about to be opened 
to all, and this was far from the case. 
In fact, the policy of 11 January 1941 
that limited visible minorities to the 
general trades would continue in 
force for another ten months.84
The situation was to change 
completely on 31 March 1942. In a 
letter to the commanding officer of 
No.1 RCAF Recruiting Centre in 
Vancouver that was distributed to 
all other RCAF Recruiting Centres, 
H.P. Crabb, now promoted to 
group captain, indicated that the 
instructions in his letter of 7 October 
1941 were cancelled. The new 
policy stated that all “Orientals and 
Negroes” who met the educational 
and fitness requirements would 
appear before a Selection Board at 
the Recruiting Centre. The board had 
to consider that the individual could 
possibly be the sole representative 
of “his race” in a unit and therefore 
recommend those who were more 
likely to do well in an aircrew 
environment.85 The responsibility 
for ensuring that an applicant had 
the “temperament, adaptability” 
and education now rested with the 
Recruiting Centre. While the delay 
between the signing of the Order-
in-Council and the promulgation of 
the new instructions could be seen as 
the result of resistance, a change of 
this magnitude would have required 
proper staff work to ensure that 
recruiting effected what the RCAF 
desired.
The change in policy was not, 
however, an end to racism. The new 
instruction had racist overtones 
in that it used a stereotype that 
most Orientals and Blacks were 
incapable of adapting to the RCAF 
work environment, and that only a 
few could succeed. These few would 
be carefully selected. The shift was 
thus from one of institutional racism 
through a complete restriction, to 
cultural racism based on the idea 
that white individuals were better 
suited to work in an Air Force culture, 
especially in a tightly-knit group such 
as found in a bomber crew. This was 
the Social Darwinism referred to by 
English in Cream of the Crop.
By shifting the review process 
to the Recruiting Centre the new 
policy of 31 March 1942 gave greater 
autonomy to the officers at the 
front lines of recruiting. Allowing 
recruiting centres to make the 
decision about suitability also meant 
that individual officers could apply 
their racist beliefs and therefore the 
policy change did not end racism 
in enlistment in the RCAF. Leonard 
Braithwaite, for example, was rejected 
because he was Black. From early 
1942 until March 1943, he visited the 
RCAF recruiting center in Toronto on 
a monthly basis and was told he was 
not eligible and should join the army. 
He even travelled to the recruiting 
centres in Hamilton and Oshawa, and 
was told he had to enlist in Toronto. 
It was only when a new recruiting 
officer arrived in Toronto that he 
was allowed to enlist and at the same 
time was advised that he could have 
enlisted at Hamilton or Oshawa.86
With the removal of the colour 
barrier for enlistment for wartime 
service, there remained the possibility 
that the RCAF could still channel 
visible minority applicants to general 
duty trades. The numbers do not, 
however, support this hypothesis. 
Of the 39 Black Canadians and 66 
Chinese Canadians who enlisted 
after the colour bar was removed, 33 
Blacks and 56 Chinese were in the 
aircrew and groundcrew categories.87 
A further area of potential 
discrimination was that of limiting 
enlistment because of the lack of 
education, which as noted, was an 
area in which Black and Chinese 
Canadians were at a disadvantage 
and that Air Force Headquarters had 
previously suggested was a means of 
rejecting candidates. Yet 10 Blacks 
and 21 Chinese are known to have 
been sent to improve their education 
under the War Emergency Training 
Plan (WETP).88 Under the WETP, 
recruits who had a deficiency in their 
education but were otherwise suitable 
for a trade were sent to upgrade 
their education at one of more than 
20 participating universities and 
technical schools. 
While the policy change of 31 
March 1942 opened the RCAF Special 
Reserve to visible minorities for 
wartime service, the pure European 
descent policy still applied to anybody 
wishing to enlist as an officer in 
the PAAF and AAAF, and as an 
airman in the AAAF. When the new, 
completely updated and renumbered 
KR (Air) were approved on 29 July 
1943 these racist policies were still 
in effect.89 By the end of the Second 
World War there were no longer any 
regulations precluding the enlistment 
of visible minorities; however, the 
practice of the RCAF, as established 
after 31 March 1942, continued to 
be one of more careful screening of 
visible minorities wishing to enlist 
both during the war and after. Their 
applications continued to be sent to 
RCAF Headquarters; and recruiting 
centres were still required to consider 
that the applicants “may be the sole 
representative of his race at a unit.”90 
This practice slowly disappeared of 
its own accord. 
Interest ingly  the  author ’s 
research, including correspondence 
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with Black and Chinese Canadians, 
found that  once these visible 
minorities were enlisted they were 
by and large judged not on skin 
colour but by how well they did 
their jobs. This conclusion reflects 
experience during the war and in 
the postwar period. The number of 
cases examined is small, however, 
and further workis required to test 
the validity of this conclusion.
One vestige of racism did re-
appear when Group Captain J.G. 
Archambault, director of personnel 
management, ordered in May 1954 
that “coloured female applicants are 
not to be considered for enrolment 
at this time.” Wing Commander P.S 
Turner rescinded this direction less 
than two weeks later, indicating that 
applications of coloured persons were 
to be sent to Air Force Headquarters.91 
This continued the practice initiated 
in March 1942.92 
Conclusion
There were similarit ies and differences among the three 
services. The Militia/Army was 
much the largest and oldest of the 
armed forces and, unlike the centrally 
administered Navy and Air Force, 
had a long and well-established 
regional organization. There were 
Army units in most localities across 
the country that had deep ties in 
communities, and did much of 
the recruiting. Thus, although the 
Army did not have any exclusionary 
enlistment regulations, practices at 
the local level varied considerably 
and created problems for Army 
Headquarters. The Army also faced 
special challenges such as the arrival 
of potential enlistees from the British 
West Indies in the Montreal area 
where the local recruiting staff had 
Mail is loaded onto a Flying Fortress of No.168 (Heavy Transport) Squadron at Rockcliffe, near Ottawa, Ontario.  Sergeant Edwin Erwin 
Phillips is handing mail bags into the aircraft.  Phillips would die in the crash of a No.168 Squadron Flying Fortress on 4 November 
1945 when it flew into a hill in Germany while delivering penicillin to Poland.  Sergeant Phillips’ brother Charles was able to enlist 
in May 1941, before the colour barrier was lifted. 
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to deal with issues that directly 
involved other federal departments, 
External Affairs and immigration 
authorities. 
The most important difference 
among the services was that the RCAF 
and RCN initiated exclusionary 
policies in 1938. In all cases Cabinet 
quickly approved the Orders-in-
Council  that implemented the 
exclusionary regulations. Whether 
the swift action, apparently without 
comment, was due to Cabinet’s 
approval of the racist policies, or 
Cabinet simply rubber-stamped 
the regulations as a matter of 
routine is hard to measure. Still, the 
fact that Cabinet approved these 
regulations made them culpable 
in racism. Equally culpable were 
the officers and bureaucrats who 
drafted and staffed the regulations 
and other directives and advice that 
demonstrated attitudes and beliefs 
towards visible minorities based 
on unfounded prejudices. Racism 
affected their job performance.
The reasons why the Air Force 
and the Navy introduced the 
exclusionary regulations are not 
documented. Until November 1938 
the RCAF was under the direction of 
the Militia, which did not have such 
restrictions on enlistment. Perhaps, 
in the process of reorganizing as 
an independent armed service, the 
RCAF adopted the policies of its 
British counterpart, as did the RCN 
when it expanded greatly on the eve 
of the war. Still it is unknown why 
the RCAF restrictions deviated from 
those of the RAF by not prohibiting 
enlistment of visible minorities as 
airmen in the regular force (PAAF), 
and then in the wartime Special 
Reserve. 
 That the RCAF wished to keep 
its leadership “white” is evident in 
that officers of all components had 
to be of pure European descent. 
Only later in the war did this change. 
For airmen, the most prestigious 
trades were those related to aircrew, 
followed by the groundcrew trades 
for the servicing of aircraft. The RCAF 
relegated visible minorities to the 
least esteemed general duty trades, a 
policy that reflected racism. This did 
not change until March 1942. 
Even with clear regulations 
and policies, some RCAF recruiting 
officers chose to ignore them. As with 
the Army, some RCAF recruiting 
officers apparently accepted or 
rejected visible minority applicants 
based on their personal opinions. How 
else does one explain the enlistment 
of the Carty brothers in contravention 
of an existing regulation against 
visible minority enlistment in the 
NPAAF/AAAF, of John Ching’s 
enlistment, or the rejections of Lionel 
Braithwaite. In this sense, the RCAF 
reflected the diversity of attitudes 
in Canadian society about race. 
However, it should also be noted 
that most recruiting officers treated 
visible minority enlistees as any other 
enlistee, as shown by the numbers 
provided additional education under 
the WETP, the proportion enlisted 
as aircrew, and the proportion who 
were commissioned.
The RCAF was the initiator of 
change, eliminating the regulations 
and pol ic ies  that  barred  the 
enlistment of visible minorities. 
Why these changes were made 
is not documented. It was not, as 
this paper has shown, because of 
any manpower problems or the 
emulation of RAF policies. It may 
be significant that the initial impetus 
came from Air Commodore Harold 
Edwards, air member for personnel, 
a nationalist who was convinced 
that RCAF personnel policies should 
reflect the values of Canadian society. 
The same was true of C.G. Power, 
minister of national defence for air 
since the creation of that portfolio 
in 1940, who supported the change. 
Similarly Angus L. Macdonald, who 
Leading Aircraftman (LAC) W.K. Rock of Windsor, Ontario and LAC T.S. Wong of 
Vancouver brush up for their final exams at No.9 Elementary Flying Training School in 
November 1943. Both graduated as pilots in 1944 but like many Canadians who won 
their wings at that time they did not realize their ambition to serve overseas. LAC Rock 
went on to be commissioned and serve as an instructor in the British Commonwealth 
Air Training Plan.  After the war he became a respected doctor in Windsor, was involved 
in many community activities and also served as coroner.
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as navy minister initiated the end of 
restrictive regulations in that service, 
had doubts about the adoption 
of British standards and practices 
and sought to “Canadianize” RCN 
personnel policies. 
Once  the  RCAF l i f ted  i t s 
enlistment barriers in March 1942, 
there were still vestiges of racism. The 
policy that required applications from 
visible minority applicants to be sent 
to the Air Force Headquarters was 
apparently based on prejudices that 
supposed that some visible minority 
members would have trouble 
working in a “White” environment. 
This ignored those White people who 
would have trouble working in the 
RCAF environment. 
This question of racism is also one 
of perspective. There is some validity 
to the argument that the RCAF should 
or could have made efforts to ensure 
racial harmony even though this was 
not a common attitude in the 1940s 
and 1950s. However, equally valid is 
the perspective that by requiring such 
applicants to demonstrate that they 
could work in a white environment, 
the RCAF was attempting to ensure 
that the presence of visible minority 
members within units did not affect 
morale and discipline. Whichever 
view one accepts, it should be noted 
that the success of those who were 
accepted would have made it easier 
for those who followed in their 
footsteps.
Notes
 1. Judy Maxwell, A Cause Worth Fighting For: 
Chinese Canadians Debate their Participation 
in the Second World War ( MA dissertation, 
University of British Columbia, 2005), 
p.12; Roy Ito, We Went to War: The Story 
of Japanese Canadians Who Served During 
the First and Second World Wars (Stittsville, 
ON: Canada’s Wings, 1984); Calvin W. 
Ruck, The Black Battalion: 1916-1920, 
Canada’s Best Kept Military Secret (Halifax, 
NS: Nimbus Publishing Limited, 1987); 
and James W. St.G. Walker, “Race and 
Recruitment in World War 1: Enlistment 
of Visible Minorities in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force,” Canadian Historical 
Review LXX, no.1 (1989), pp.1-26.
 2. This paper uses the differentiation that 
regulations are those prescriptions 
approved by the Cabinet, such as 
the King’s Regulations and Orders, 
while policies are those prescriptions 
that the three services create on their 
own authority, such as the Air Force 
Administrative Orders.
 3. See Patricia E. Roy, “The Soldiers Canada 
Didn’t Want: Her Chinese and Japanese 
Citizens,” Canadian Historical Review 
LIX, no.3 (1978), pp.341-258; Marjorie 
Wong; The Dragon and the Maple Leaf 
(London, ON: Pirie Publishing, 1994); 
Maxwell, A Cause Worth Fighting For; Ito, 
We Went to War; Dennis McLaughlin and 
Leslie McLaughlin, Fighting For Canada: 
Chinese and Japanese Canadians in Military 
Service (Ottawa: Minister of National 
Defence, 2003); and Dennis McLaughlin 
and Leslie McLaughlin, For My Country: 
Black Canadians on the Field of Honour 
(Ottawa: Minister of National Defence, 
2004). The first four publications are well-
researched academic works; the latter two 
publications contain many inaccuracies 
and generalizations.
 4. The policies towards Canada’s Aboriginal 
people are covered very well in Scott 
Sheffield, “Of Pure European Descent 
and of the White Race: Recruitment Policy 
and Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945,” 
Canadian Military History 5, no.1 (Spring 
1996), pp.8-15 and Michael D. Stevenson, 
“The Mobilisation of Native Canadians 
During the Second World War,” Journal 
of the Canadian Historical Association 
(1996), pp.205-226. In November 1939, 
RCAF Headquarters directed that the 
pure European descent policy did not 
apply to North American Indians. See 
Library and Archives Canada [LAC], 
RG 24, vol.3307, file 282-1-2, pt. 2, letter 
27-3, 11 November 1939, Flying Officer 
O.S. Dunn to secretary, Department of 
National Defence, minute 3; and 1019-1-
63, Flying Officer J.H. Hollies to officer 
in charge Recruiting Centre, Montreal, 
18 November 1939.
 5. This article will use the term “Militia” for 
the army prior to 1940 and “Army” after 
1940, when the name changed.
 6. House of Commons, Debates, 22 May 1912, 
cc 1907-8, 12 December 1911, cc 2129-30, 
8 May 1912, cc 376-9. Clifford Pereira, 
Black Liberators: The Role of African & Arabs 
sailors in the Royal Navy within the Indian 
Ocean 1841-1941, p.8, <portal.unesco.org/
culture/en/files/38503/122910237757.
BlackLiberators.pdf/7.BlackLiberators.
pdf>, accessed 15 August 2011.
 7. “Royal Naval Air Service,” Flight (3 
July 1914), p.705; provides the details 
of “Regulations for the Special Entry of 
Officers into the Royal Naval Air Service” 
while the RFC regulations for Canada are 
noted in Canadian Forces Directorate of 
History and Heritage [DHH] 73/208, 
“Regulations for the selection in Canada 
of candidates admission to the Royal 
Flying Corps Cadet Wing,” which 
clearly states that a candidates must 
be of pure European descent. “New 
Zealand’s Birdmen,” Feilding Star, 17 
September 1917, <paperspast.natlib.
govt.nz/cgi-bin/paperspast?a+d&d=
FS19170917.2.16>, accessed 15 August 
2011.
 8. Cited in Clive Richards, “The Origins 
of Military Aviation in India and the 
Creation of the Indian Air Force, 1910 
– 1932, Part Two: The RAF in India and 
the Creation of the Indian Air Force, 1918-
1932,” Royal Air Force Air Power Review 11, 
no.1 (Spring 2008), p.37. 
 9. Richards, “The Origins of Military 
Aviation in India,” p.37. Richards 
suggests the five Indian officers were 
able to enlist due to the interventions 
of senior officers. For Shreve, see DHH 
77/661, Service Cards of Canadians in 
RNAS, RFC and RAF. 
10. Richards, “The Origins of Military 
Aviation in India,” p.35. 
11. London Gazette, 12 February 1924; and 
“Military Notes,” Journal of the Royal 
United Services Institution 67, no.468, 
p.756.
12. Regulations and Instructions for the 
Royal Canadian Navy, 1937; paras 2, 
138, 143C, 143D and 144; Regulations 
and Instructions for the Royal Canadian 
Naval Reserve, 1940; paras 57 and 
77; Regulations and Instructions for 
the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer 
Reserve, 1938; paras 7.2, 32, and 42.
13. LAC, RG 24, vol.3811, file 1012-5-27, W.G. 
Wells, acting deputy minister to under 
secretary of state for external affairs, 2 
December 1941.
14. See, for example, LAC, RG 24 vol.5620, 
file 30-2-12, chief of naval personnel to 
deputy minister, 29 October 1942.
15. D H H  1 1 2 . 3 H 1 . 0 0 9  ( D 2 9 3 ) ,  K . S . 
Maclachlan, acting deputy minister to 
Dr. Charles Camsell, deputy director, 
Department of Mines and Resources.
16. DHH 81/520/1000-100/2, Naval Board 
meeting of 9 November 1942, item 69-5. 
The term “coloured” was used by the 
RCN to denote all persons not of white 
skin colour.
17. LAC, RG 24, vol.5620, file 30-2-12, 
secretary, Naval Board to all commanding 
officers of reserve divisions, 15 May 
1943, “Naval Monthly Order 2653.” For 
the evolution of the amendment, see 
DHH 81/520/1000-100/2, Naval Board 
meeting of 12 November 1942, Item 70-
3, meeting of 11 January 1943, item 87-4, 
meeting of 14 January 1943, item 88-4, and 
meeting of 14 February 1943, item 897-2.
18. For the evolution of the amendment, see 
DHH 81/520/1000-100/2, Naval Board 
meeting of 12 November 1942, item 70-3, 
meeting of 11 January 1943, item 87-4, 
meeting of 14 January 1943, item 88-4, and 
meeting of 14 February 1943, item 897-2. 
19. Canadian Naval Regulations 1942, 
amendments 255-260, 22 July 1944. In 
six separate sections the reference was 
changed from “white race and British 
15
: Racism and Enlistment The Second World War Policies of the Royal Canadian Air Force
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
32
subjects” to “a British subject.” The 
six sections related to specific officer 
categories and to ratings.
20. “Manpower Problems of the Royal 
Canadian Navy during the Second World 
War,” Army Headquarters Historical 
Section, report no.71, para 29.
21. W.A.B. Douglas, Roger Sarty and Michael 
Whitby, et al., No Higher Purpose: The 
Official Operational History of the Royal 
Canadian Navy in the Second World 
War, 1939-1943, Volume II, Part 1 (St. 
Catharines, ON: Vanwell Publishing 
and the Department of National Defence, 
2002), pp.133, 149.
22. Maxwell, A Cause Worth Fighting For, fn 
117. Lore had been employed as a radio 
operator by the Department of Transport, 
Radio Division, Marine Branch and Air 
Services Branch. It is unknown how 
his case came to the attention of Vice-
Admiral Nelles; and Roy Ito, We Went to 
War, p.153. After his RCN release Tsubota 
joined the Black Watch (Royal Highland 
Regiment) and was with their company 
at Dieppe, was captured and spent the 
remainder of the war as a prisoner of war.
23. LAC, RG 24, vol.5620, file 30-2-12. The 
contents of this file suggest that the 
Navy had been admitting Blacks into 
these trades; however, without names 
of individuals or related files that clearly 
indicate this occurrence, Black enlistment 
prior to March 1943 must remain one of 
supposition through inference and not 
of fact. One such letter that supports this 
inference is from the secretary, Naval 
Board to the Honourable G.B. Isnor, M.P., 
62-21-50, F.D. 11018, 27 May 1943 found 
in ibid.
24. King’s Regulations and Order for the 
Canadian Militia, 1939, paras 127 and 
145. The Permanent Active Militia (PAM) 
was the name of the regular serving 
component while Non-Permanent Active 
Militia (NPAM) referred to the reserve 
component. The term “Canadian Army” 
did not come into use until 1940 at which 
time the PAM became the Canadian 
Army (Active) and the NPAM the 
Canadian Army (Reserve).
25. Issued under General Order 239 of 12 
December 1939, based on Order-in-
Council P.C. 4023 of 5 December 1939.
26. John G. Armstrong, “The Unwelcome 
Sacrifice: A Black Unit in the Canadian 
Expeditionary Force, 1917-19,” in Nandor 
F. Dreisziger, ed., Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic 
Armed Forces from the Time of the Hapsburgs 
to the Age of the Superpowers (Waterloo, 
ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 
1990), pp.178-197. See footnote 10 in 
which Armstrong interviewed Mr. 
Thamis Gale of Montreal who had been 
tracing Black-Canadian veterans in the 
CEF.
27. Ibid. Mr. Gale suggested seven had 
been commissioned. Bertrand enlisted 
23 September 1916 at Valcartier. He 
was from St. George’s, Grenada where 
he had previously served for two years 
in the Grenada Volunteers. See LAC 
database on Soldiers of the First World 
War, Enlistment Papers of Lancelot 
Joseph Ber t rand.  <ht tp ://www.
collectionscanada.gc.ca/databases/
cef/001042-119.01-e.php?&id_nbr=41501
&interval=20&&PHPSESSID=3kcandrug
2j3q17ltsugsb94p1>, accessed 18 August 
2011. Although he was initially enlisted 
to be an officer in charge of records, he 
was killed on 15 August 1917, while 
a member of the 7th Battalion (British 
Columbia Regiment) during the assault 
on Hill 70. A month previously he had 
been gazetted for the Military Cross. 
Veterans’ Affairs Canada, Canadian 
Virtual War memorial website. <http://
www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/collections/
virtualmem/Detail/1565241>, accessed 
18 August 2011.
28. DHH 321.009 (D250), Lieutenant Colonel 
Dunbar to Mr. Husbands, 2 August 1938.
29. Ibid., Brigadier Dunbar to secretary, 
DND, 5 September 1939 and Major-
General Matthews to secretary, DND, 15 
September 1939.
30. Ibid.,  undated document labelled 
“Coloured Troops.” The document location 
in the file suggests that the survey was 
taken near the start of the war. Similarly, 
Major-General Constantine noted that 
highland regiments were particularly 
opposed to enlisting coloured persons, 
while others did not mind accepting a few. 
Major-General Constantine to secretary, 
DND, 19 June 1940. 
31. Ibid., Brigadier B.W. Browne to DOC, MD 
6, 8 July 1940.
32. Ibid., Brigadier C.E. Connolly, DOC MD 
6 to secretary, DND, 25 May 1941; and 
Major-General B.W. Browne to DOC, MD 
6, 5 June 1941.
33. LAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5280, 
Robertson to Desrosiers, 14 July 1941
34. DHH 391.009 (D7), Major W.H. Scott to 
commissioner of police, 29 August 1941.
35. Ibid., Major W.H. Scott to Major H. 
Peebles, 18 August 1941.
36. This first group was composed of 16 Black 
and 12 white candidates and the second 
21 Black and 15 white. Ibid., “Name of 
first draft of Canadian Active Army from 
Barbados, B.W.I.,” hand-dated that they 
embarked 27 September and indicating 
what service they joined. The lone RCAF 
recruit was white as was the lone rejected 
recruit. See “Nominal Roll – Volunteers 
from British West Indies (1st Group),” 
28 October 1941. At least 18 had arrived 
prior to this group. No indication is given 
as to their skin colour. See “Nominal Roll 
– Volunteers from British West Indies,” 
undated but shows dates from 30 July to 
9 September 1941, starting with Daniel 
Richard Bradshaw; and “Nominal Roll – 
Volunteers from British West Indies (2nd 
Group),” 28 October 1941. It should be 
noted that at least four joined the Royal 
Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve, 
although the records do not indicate their 
skin colour.
37. LAC, RG 24, series C-1, reel C-5280, 
HQ 54-27-8-c T2 (A.P. 4), Desrosiers 
to Robertson, 24 July 1941. The first 
part of the file number indicates the 
subject, while the suffix, in this case 
(A.P.4), indicates which office in the 
Army Headquarters staff prepared the 
response. 
38. Ibid., HQ 54-27-2-6 (A.P.4), 1 August 1941. 
39. Ibid., Crerar to Ralston, 26 September 
1941.
40. LAC, RG 24 series C-1, reel C-5280, HQS 
8853 (M&R), 26 September 1941.
41. Ibid., Blair to Robertson, 18 October 1941.
42. Ibid., Collier to King, 27 October 1941.
43. Ibid., attorney general to minister, HQS 
8853 (DAG), 14 November 1941 (two 
letters).
44. Ibid., Campbell to D of O.A.A., HQS 8853 
(DOS. A.), 24 March 1942 and Letson to 
OC “Y” Force, HQS 8853 F.D. 2 (DAG), 4 
April 1942.
45. Ibid., HQS 8853, pt. 2 (AP 1), 29 April 
1943, précis 1. The figure of 75 is based on 
extrapolations of Black to White enlistee 
ratios in the documents for which no skin 
colour is listed, based on the ratio in those 
documents in which the skin colour is 
listed, which totals 37 Black enlistees.
46. Wong, The Dragon and the Maple Leaf, 
pp.86-106. In July 1942, retired Lieutenant-
Colonel D.P. McCallum sent a letter to 
the RCAF’s “Pacific [sic, Western] Air 
Command.” McCallum suggested that 
the RCAF form a signals wing, believing it 
would be possible to recruit 400 Chinese. 
The RCAF was not interested in a signals 
wing and forwarded the letter on to the 
Army’s Pacific Command. The response 
within Pacific Command was that this had 
been rejected in the past as “impractical” 
and that McCallum had brought this 
up before with that Command. See the 
correspondence in file DHH 322.009 
(D814) and DHH 322.009 (D478), D.P. 
McCallum to “Officer Commanding, 
Pacific Air Command,” 20 July 1942 and 
hand-written notes attached
47. For the RCAF expansion of early 1939, 
“hundreds of  applications” were 
received for the 76 pilot positions. 
“Flying ‘University’ Planned in R.C.A.F.,” 
Montreal Gazette, 13 June 1939.
48. The statistics are derived from the RCAF 
section of the Annual Reports of the 
Department of National Defence.
49. Allan D. English, The Cream of the Crop: 
Canadian Aircrew, 1939-1945 (Montreal 
and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1996), p.24. While these ideas were 
espoused before the First World War, 
there is no indication in English’s work 
that they were factors used in aircrew 
selection after the War. An interesting 
counter-point is that of Major A.C. Oxley, 
a Canadian engineer, who points out that 
Asiatic peoples had regularly overrun 
Europe and even in the twentieth century 
had achieved success against them, hence 
the fallacy of white superiority. See A.C. 
Oxley, “The Military Value of the White 
16
Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/3
33
Race,” Canadian Defence Quarterly XIII, 
no.3 (April 1936), pp.322-6.
50. English, The Cream of the Crop, p.25.
51. Ibid., pp.28-40 for a discussion on the 
evolution of aircrew selection toward a 
more scientific basis in the RCAF during 
the Second World War.
52. See Robin W. Winks, The Blacks in Canada 
(Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1971), Chapter 12, 
“Source of Strength – The Schools”, 
pp.362-389; especially p.388.
53. DHH, “Manpower Problems of the 
Royal Canadian Air Force during the 
Second World War,” Army Headquarters 
Historical Section Report No.67, 15 
January 1954, p.28.
54. King’s Regulations and Orders for the 
RCAF, 1924; paras 212A and 269A.
55. LAC, RG 24, vol.17805, pt. 6. Although the 
modern abbreviation for these regulations 
would be KR&O, this paper uses the 
contemporary RCAF abbreviation KR 
(Air)
56. Army General Order G.O. 141 /1938, 
of 15 September 1938 further to Order 
in Council PC 1994 of 17 August 1938. 
The change was issued in Army General 
Orders as the RCAF was still under the 
command of the Army until November 
1938. The amendment was to paragraph 
212A.
57. This phrase was issued as KR (Air) Para 
275 (c). LAC, RG 24, vol.17805, pt. 7, FD 
418 had the changes for airmen. See Air 
Force General Order No. 3/1939 issued 
on 31 January 1939 for the change for 
airmen. It is interesting to note that as 
Gerald Bell had enlisted in 1936, the 
phrasing of the new regulation would 
have precluded him from continuing 
his service when it came time for him to 
reenlist.
58. The change was submitted to Privy 
Council Office on 24 January 1939 
and approved on 31 January. It was 
promulgated as Air Force General Order 
No. 3/1939. LAC, RG 24, vol.17805, pt. 7, 
FD 418.
59. This was achieved through Order in 
Council PC 2677 of 14 September 1939. 
The other components of the RCAF 
were the Permanent Active Air Force, 
the Auxiliary Active Air Force and the 
Reserve Force.
60. On several occasions during the war the 
Cabinet approved increases to the PAAF 
establishment; however, these were 
minor. 
61. LAC, RG 24, Box 17805, pt. 8, FD 280, 
approved by Order in Council P.C. 3050 
of 11 October 1939 and promulgated in 
Air Force General Order 54 of 13 October 
1939. This amendment would become KR 
(Air) paragraphs 211 F. 
62. The original section, in an undated draft, 
read “[o]f pure European descent except 
in case of an appointment to the Special 
Reserve and a British Subject, the son of 
parents both of whom are, or if deceased 
were at the time of their deaths, British 
Subjects [underscoring added],” ibid.
63. LAC, RG 24, vol.17805, pt.8, FD 488. 
The policy was promulgated in KR (Air) 
paragraph 269A, which later became para 
277.
64. LAC, RG 24, accession 1983-84, vol.298, 
file 304-117, S6496, 1 May 1940.
65. Some confusion resulted by reports 
from the recruiting staff in Vancouver 
that they had encountered airmen in 
the service who were visible minorities: 
for example Flight Lieutenant A.A. 
Harcourt-Vernon, 15 November 1940 in 
LAC, RG 24, series E-1-b, vol.3302, file 
280-1-2, pt. 5 and RG 24, vol.3307, file 
282-1-2, pt. 2, Flying Officer O.S. Dunn 
to secretary, Department of National 
Defence, minute 3. For pamphlets 
describing the requirement for aircrew 
to be of pure European descent see DHH 
181.006 (D505) 1019-1-67, 1 February 1940, 
Enlistment, Royal Canadian Air Force 
(Special Reserve) Conditions of Service 
– Pilots and Aircraft Crew and 181.009 
(D5972) Information relative to Entry into 
the Royal Canadian Air Force, 4 February 
1941.
66. LAC, RG 24, series E-1-c, accession 
1983-84/049, vol.309, file 315-1, pt. 1; 
acting DM (Air) to USSEA, 11 January 
1941 states that for aircrew, only those 
of pure European descent would be 
accepted, and for ground-crew, only 
those who were particularly well-suited 
would be accepted as the RCAF already 
had long waiting lists for ground-crew 
trades. In LAC, RG 24, accession 1983-84, 
vol.298, file 304-117, pt.7, a letter to the 
Reverend C.H. Este dated 8 May 1941 
indicates that that were no barriers to 
“Negroes” enlisting in certain categories 
of the RCAF. The Reverend Este of Union 
United Church in Montreal was well 
known in the community for his efforts 
on behalf of Black-Montrealers. The 
documentary “A Hundred Years of Faith” 
by Anthony Sherwood is recommended 
viewing about the Union United Church. 
There were three classes of enlistees 
in the RCAF: aircrew (who flew in the 
airplanes), groundcrew (who serviced 
the airplanes), and general trades (who 
provided support to the other two 
groups). 
67. LAC, RG 24, accession 1983-84/049, 
vol.298, file 304-117, S.45-12-1 (DAFM), 
Wing Commander H.P. Crabb to all 
RCAF Recruiting Centres, 7 October 1941. 
It is interesting to note that this policy 
letter was generated after the RCAF had 
sent its amended policy on enlistment, 
which eliminated exclusionary policies in 
the Special Reserve, to the Privy Council 
Office, and after Cabinet had accepted the 
recommendation to eliminate this racist 
policy.
68. Ibid. 
69. Ito, We Went to War, pp.160-1.
70. DHH, 76/10, RCAF Personnel Cards
71. Interview, Mathias Joost with Samuel 
(Sammy) Estwick, 8 September 2006. 
Having been rejected although well 
qualified, he wrote to his local Member 
of Parliament, Clarence Gillis, who 
asked questions first of the minister 
and later in the House of Commons. 
In a letter received from the RCAF 
Recruiting Centre in Halifax, dated 6 
June 1941, Mr. Estwick was advised 
there were no vacancies for wireless 
operator (ground) and that he should 
try the Army. This referral to the Army 
was in accordance with RCAF policy. In 
September he was offered enlistment as 
a standard tradesman – a general duties 
trade – again in accordance with RCAF 
policy of the time. On 17 December 1941 
he was enrolled. Letters are courtesy of 
Kathy Grant at The Legacy Voices Project, 
through the Estwick family.
72. L A C ,  R G  2 4 ,  v o l . 1 7 8 0 6 ,  p t . 1 1 , 
memorandum from Flight Lieutenant 
F.G. Ault, D.A.P. to D.A.F.M., 1011-1-4, 
6 January 1940.
73. L A C ,  R G  2 4 ,  v o l . 1 7 8 0 6 ,  p t .  1 1 , 
memorandum for Minister’s Office, 27 
March 1941, Wing Commander H.R. 
Stewart, air Secretary to air member for 
personnel.
74. Ibid., memorandum, Air Commodore 
Edwards to DAP, 4 April 1941. The AMP 
Branch was responsible for developing 
policies related to personnel matters, 
including enlistment and terms of service.
75. “Manpower Problems of the RCAF,” 
para. 50.
76. Ibid., para. 62 and DHH 83/345 mfm, 
CWC Meeting of 15 July 1942 where the 
MND Air indicated that a shortage of 
aircrew was being experienced.
77. Figures taken from Jin Tan and Patricia 
Roy, The Chinese in Canada (Ottawa: 
Canadian Historical Association, 1985), 
p.9; Hugh Johnston, The East Indians in 
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Historical 
Association, 1984), p.16; James W. St.G. 
Walker, The West Indians in Canada 
(Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 
1984), p.10 and Government of Canada, 
Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The 
Canada Year Book, 1945 (Ottawa: Edmond 
Cloutier, 1945), p.105. By comparison, 
aboriginal people comprised 1.09 percent 
of the population.
78. Marika Sherwood, “Walter White and 
the British: A Lost Opportunity” in 
Contributions in Black Studies: A Journal of 
African and Afro-American Studies 9, no.1, 
p.216. 
79. See LAC, RG 24, series E-1-c, accession 
1983-84/049 vol.309, file 315-1, pt. 1, 
Letter from Air Commodore Edwards 
to Mr. Dyke, 1019-1-63 (DAP), 20 May 
1941. The RAF Volunteer Reserve 
corresponded with the RCAF Special 
Reserve. While the British government 
had announced on 19 October 1939 that 
the colour bar was lifted in the armed 
services for the duration of the war, the 
RAF continued to believe that they could 
meet their recruiting goals from their 
traditional recruiting grounds. However, 
the mounting casualties through June 
1940 caused the RAF to reconsider 
and launch the Air Ministry Overseas 
17
: Racism and Enlistment The Second World War Policies of the Royal Canadian Air Force
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier,
34
Recruitment Scheme. In November 1940, 
the Air Ministry informed the Colonial 
Office that it would be prepared to 
accept Black aircrew candidates from the 
colonies. Roger Lambo, “Achtung The 
Black Prince: West Africans in the Royal 
Air Force, 1939-46,” in David Killingray, 
ed., Africans in Britain (Ilford, Essex, 
England: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1994), 
pp.148-9.
80. Brereton Grenhous, Stephen J. Harris, 
William C. Johnston and William G.P. 
Rawling, The Crucible of War 1939-1945: 
The Official History of the Royal Canadian 
Air Force Volume III (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press and the Department 
of National Defence, 1994), pp.51-52; 
Suzanne K. Edwards, Gus: From Tapper 
Boy to Air Marshal (Renfrew, ON: General 
Store Publishing, 2007), esp. pp. 93-94; 
Norman Ward, ed., A Party Politician: 
The Memoirs of Chubby Power (Toronto: 
Macmillan, 1966), pp. 214-236.
81. LAC, RG 24, vol.17806, pt. 11, Draft Air 
Force General Order, 1011-1-4, 10 April 
1941 and draft of 8 April 1941 and 1011-1-
4 FD 930, 23 April 1941, Air Vice-Marshal 
Breadner to the Honourable C.G. Power.
82. Ibid., pt. 12.
83. Letter, Power to Gillis, 28 May 1941; 
Papers of Samuel Estwick courtesy of 
Kathy Grant, The Legacy Voices Project.
84. See endnote 64.
85. LAC, RG 24, accession 1983-84/049, 
vol.298, file 304-117, S.45-12-1 (D. of 
M.3), Group Captain H.P. Crabb to 
commanding officer,  No, 1 RCAF 
Recruiting Centre, Vancouver, 31 March 
1942.
86. Stanley C. Lartey, My Visit with Leonard 
A. Braithwaite, C.M., O.Ont., Q.C. (N.p.: 
Ontario Black History Society, 2009), 
pp.8-10.
87. The statistics are based on lists created 
by the author on confirmed Black- and 
Chinese-Canadian enlistees in the RCAF 
during the Second World War.
88. Ibid. 
89. The new regulations became “King’s 
Regulations for the Royal Canadian 
Air Force, 1943,” were authorized by 
Order in Council P.C. 5986 on 29 July 
and became effective on 1 October 
1943. Paragraph 124 (1)(a) stated that 
applicants for commissioning had to 
be of pure European descent, British 
subjects and sons of parents who were 
British subjects or British subjects at the 
time of their deaths. Sub-paragraph (2) 
indicated that sub-sub-paragraph (1)(a) 
applied only to the PAAF and AAAF. 
Paragraph 129 on commissioning in the 
Special Reserve had no requirement for 
applicants to be British subjects or of pure 
European descent. Similarly, for airmen, 
the PAAF and AAAF (paragraphs 171 
and 172) only required the applicant to 
be a British subject; the Special Reserve 
had no such requirement.
90. This is noted in at least six letters from 
1946 to 1956. See LAC, RG 24, accession 
1983-84/049, vol.298, file 304-117, letter 
S45-12-1 (DSM) 4 October 1946; letter S48-
1, 21 July 1949; letter S45-12-1 (DRM) 22 
September 1950; letter S-304-101 (DPM) 
30 March 1953; letter S304-101 (DPM) 7 
May 1954, letter S-304-101 (DPM) 18 July 
1956. The letters of 22 September 1950 
Mathias Joost has served in the 
Canadian Forces for 23 years in both 
the regular force and the reserve. 
He completed his MA in 2008, with 
a thesis examining the formation of 
the RCAF Auxiliary squadrons in 
1932. He is currently the officer in 
charge of the operational records 
team at the Directorate of History 
and Heritage, National Defence 
Headquarters, Ottawa. His primary 
areas of research are the RCAF 
Auxiliary and visible minorities in 
the military.
and 30 March 1953 even indicated at 
paragraph 5 “When the text of this letter 
has been read and understood, it is to be 
destroyed.” 
91. Ibid., letter S304-101 (DPM) 7 May 1954 
and letter S304-101, TD 133 (DPM) 18 May 
1954 and Letter S304-101 (DPM) 19 May 
1954. 
92. That an officer of lesser rank would 
counter an instruction or order from a 
superior officer indicates that the actions 
of the superior were not supported. 
18
Canadian Military History, Vol. 21 [], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss1/3
